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THE EVENING HOURS DURING PACIFICA STANDARD TIME
C. EDWIN BAKER*
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation' has been described as possibly the
worst of the Supreme Court's First Amendment decisions.2 I have
no interest in disagreeing. Here, however, rather than critiquing
Pacifica, I want to take another tack and ask one theoretical and
one practical question about the decision. First, to what extent is it
consistent with a strong interpretation of First Amendment guaran-
tees? Second, to what extent does it recognize governmental power
to channel indecent broadcast expression? For example, does it au-
thorize barring indecency from prime time evening hours?
To begin, note the constitutional issue presented in the case.
Justice Stevens' plurality decision3 emphatically and repeatedly
stated that review was "limited to the question whether the Commis-
sion has the authority to proscribe this particular broadcast;"4 or as
later stated, whether the government has "any power to restrict the
public broadcast of indecent language in any circumstances."5 Ac-
cording to Justice Powell's concurrence, the Court reviewed only
"the Commission's holding that Carlin's monologue was indecent
'as broadcast' at two o'clock in the afternoon." 6 Likewise, in the
one opinion in the court below that voted to uphold the Federal
Communication Commission's (FCC) order, and hence the only
opinion below favoring suppression and consistent with the
* Nicholas F. Gallicchio Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law
School. The view presented in this talk substantially corresponds to arguments I
presented in a brief filed for the American Civil Liberties Union, the National
Federation of Community Broadcasters, Pen American Center and Allen Ginsberg
in Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
1. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). The Court held that the FCC had the power to re-
strict as indecent Pacifica's broadcast of George Carlin's monologue entitled
"Filthy Words" at two o'clock on a weekday afternoon. Id. at 748-49.
2. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker and LA. Powe, Jr., Televised Vlenc 64 VA. L.
Rv. 1123, 1280 (1978) (describing Paciica as "decision to war with several key
strands of First Amendment thought").
3. Note that Justice Steven's opinion at points was that of the Court and at
other times was a plurality opinion.
4. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 742. Justice Stevens went on to state that the FCC itself
emphasized that its order was "issued in a specific factual context." Id.
5. Id. at 744. Justice Stevens argued that if the First Amendment grants the
government any power to circumscribe the public broadcast of indecent language,
this situation was a proper time for the exercise of this power. Id.
6. Id. at 755-56 (Powell, J., concurring).
(45)
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Supreme Court's resolution of the issue, Judge Leventhal read the
FCC order as limited to "afternoon" broadcasts.7 Judge Leventhal
noted that, while the FCC disclaimed an intent to block such broad-
casts in "late hours of the evening," it left unexamined the propriety
of restricting the broadcast in the "early evening," which Judge
Leventhal thought raised different issues.8 In any event, the Court
only held that the two o'clock p.m. broadcast could be barred.9
Both the plurality and concurrence implicitly approved chan-
neling. Justice Stevens concluded by invoking the nuisance ration-
ale in support of the broadcast restriction, a rationale that the FCC
had explained speaks "to channeling behavior more than actually
prohibiting it."10 Both Justices Powell and Stevens observed that
"[o]n its face, [the FCC's holding] does not prevent respondent
Pacifica Foundation from broadcasting the monologue during late
evening hours when fewer children are likely to be in the
audience."1"
The permissible extent of channeling depends on the explana-
tion for why it is constitutionally acceptable. In this Article, I will
suggest two different explanations for permitting the channeling of
speech - one consistent with only what I will describe as "weak"
speech protection, the other consistent with "strong" speech pro-
tection. While the Pacifica opinions offer each some support, I will
argue that only strong speech protection accords with precedent
and, moreover, only strong protection accords with various factors
emphasized in the Court's opinions.
I. WEAK PROTECTION
All Justices agree that the First Amendment protects indecent
speech. The Court in Pacifica noted earlier holdings that made this
assertion clear.12 Thus, the Court's decision not to protect inde-
cency requires explanation.
7. Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 32 (1977) (Leventhal, J., dissenting),
rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
8. Id. at 30. Justice Powell seemed largely to agree with Judge Leventhal's
approach and described Judge Leventhal's opinion as "thoughtful." Pacifica, 438
U.S. at 757 n.1.
9. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750.
10. Id. at 731 (quoting In re Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica Found. Sta-
tion WBAI (FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (1975)) (emphasis in original).
11. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 760. See also id. at 750 n.28 (explaining effects of
Commission's actions on adults).
12. See id. at 746-47 (citing Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) and Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) to demonstrate that offensive or indecent speech is
not without First Amendment protection).
[Vol. III: p. 45
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Any one of three premises that derogate from strong speech
protection could support the Court's decision not to provide strong
protection for the speech at issue in Pacifica. First, maybe the First
Amendment does not call for strong protection here because "each
medium of expression presents special First Amendment problems"
and broadcasting "receive [s] the most limited First Amendment
protection."1 3 Second, maybe the First Amendment does not re-
quire strong protection because indecent speech "surely lie[s] at
the periphery of First Amendment concern," 14 which leaves the
Court uninterested in applying "[strong] medicine to preserve the
vigor of patently offensive sexual and excretory speech."1 5 Third,
maybe freedom of speech is only protected to the extent that it is
not outweighed by other concerns; especially when considerations,
such as the broadcasting context or indecency's lesser value, reduce
the weight on the speech side, and various government interests,
such as an interest in protecting children, outweigh the speech
rights. 16
Each explanation, although embedded in the Court's opinion,
is deeply controversial, arguably inconsistent with precedent and
possibly inconsistent with some features of Pacifica itself. Thus, I
will consider whether the Court's holding can be understood as in-
dependent of each of the proffered explanations. First, however, I
will note several objections to these three points.
Reduced First Amendment protection cannot be properly ex-
plained on the ground that Pacifica is a broadcasting case. Until
Pacifica, the only general reason why broadcasting was said to re-
ceive different and lesser constitutional protection than other me-
dia related to its supposed scarcity. As the dissent points out, a
concern with scarcity only justifies regulation to assure access for
speech (or speakers) that otherwise would be left out.17 Scarcity
hardly justifies suppressing any form of speech, including indecent
speech. The Court wisely chose not to rely on it. Thus, broadcast-
ing precedent hardly explains the reduced First Amendment vigor
exemplified by Pacifica.'8
13. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748. The Court here cited Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495, 502-03 (1952), where the Court followed its famous language about each
method presenting peculiar problems with the statement: "But the basic princi-
ples of freedom of speech and the press... do not vary." Id.
14. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 743.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 749-50.
17. Id. at 770 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
18. The Court invoked other arguments concerning the special nature of
broadcasting, but their weakness coupled with the lack of reliance on them, sug-
1996]
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Elsewhere, I have challenged the assumption that a careful ex-
amination of Court precedent will show the Court justifying re-
duced or different protection for broadcasting.1 9 I argued that a
close reading of Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC20 shows that the
broadcast regulation was not justified by any scarcity unique to
broadcasting, but rather was a response to the problem of the "com-
mons."21 However, without legal regulation, usually in the form of
property rules, this problem of commons would also exist for re-
sources used by print media and for most other valuable resources
that have been the subject of property law. This reading of Red Lion
as not based on principles unique to broadcasting why, at three crit-
ical points in its analysis, the Court relied on precedent from the
print media, namely Associated Press v. United States,22 which upheld
the government's right to engage in structural regulation of the
media in support of a better communication order. Of course, this
is not contrary to the observation that "each medium of expression
present special First Amendment problems."23 For example, the
way that the government can permissibly aid parents in controlling
their children's access to indecency will vary depending on the me-
dia. Similarly, the government may act on the belief that a category
of theaters when geographically concentrated often does, while tel-
evision does not, attract people who are likely to create predictable
problems for a particular geographical area.24 But these observa-
tions are not equivalent to saying that different principles apply or
that each medium should receive a different degree of First Amend-
ment protection. Rather, the expectation is that whatever restric-
tions the Constitution imposes on channeling will be the same for
all media, despite the fact that the permitted channeling itself can
take different forms depending on the nature of the medium.
gests that it would be useful to see if Pacifica could be understood without them.
For example, although the Court would be right that radio waves pass through a
person's house without permission, it is quite difficult to see that the person has
less choice about whether to display messages carried by those waves on a home
monitor than the person has about whether to answer a phone, receive cable pro-
gramming or permit the entry of a person at the door.
19. C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: Content-Based Regulation of Persons and
Presses, 1994 Sup. CT. REV. 57 (1995). Thus, my claim was consistent with the usu-
ally unquoted language from Burstyn asserting that First Amendment principles do
not vary from medium to medium. See supra note 13.
20. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
21. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
22. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
23. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
24. Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 71-73 (1976).
[Vol. III: p. 45
4
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol3/iss1/3
THE EVENING HoURs
Further, Pacifica itself is not special as a broadcasting case.
Both Justices Stevens' and Powell's opinion relied on Ginsberg v.
New York, 2 5 an earlier non-broadcasting case that approved a type of
channeling. 26 In Ginsberg, the law at issue prohibited bookstores
from selling material to minors that the state considered obscene
for children but that was constitutionally protected for adults.
2 7
The Court upheld this combination of space and age zoning of sex-
ually explicit materials,2 8 thus providing a perfect print analogy to
the broadcast regulation in Pacifica.
Even more tellingly, two years before Pacifica, the Court em-
ployed almost identical reasoning to reach an almost identical con-
clusion in another non-broadcasting case. In Young v. American
Mini Theaters, Inc.,29 the Court approved a zoning regulation that
required the dispersal of theaters showing "adult movies" - a
category of indecent but largely protected speech.3 0 Although
Pacifica's channeling involved time zoning and Young's involved
space zoning, both cases approved zoning because each needed to
advance a government purpose unrelated to- restricting adult access
to protected speech. The plurality and concurrence, constituting
the five member majority in both cases, engaged in similar analyses
to reject the same constitutional objections to the government
channeling. For example, both cases rejected the complaint that
being content-based made the law invalid.3 ' The overwhelming
similarities suggest that the two cases should be read together to
create a single doctrinal edifice - an edifice independent of any
premise of lesser protection for broadcasting.
25. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
26. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749-50 (Stevens, J., plurality), 757 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
27. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. 629, 631-32.
28. Id. at 629.
29. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
30. Id. at 69. As in Pacifica, the plurality in Young described Ginsberg as "di-
rectly on point," further illustrating the Court's recognition that certain zoning in
each of the three mediums - print, theater and broadcast - will be acceptable. Id.
31. Pacifica. 438 U.S. at 755; Young, 427 U.S. at 50. In both cases, Justice Pow-
ell argued that the government regulation was not content-based. Pacifica, 438
U.S. at 755; Young, 427 U.S. at 73. Justice Blackmun concurred with this view in
Pacifica. 438 U.S. at 755-62 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In contrast, Justice Ste-
vens, partly for the Court in both cases, but in this regard for a plurality, viewed the
law as content-based, but concluded that it was not an objectionable form of con-
tent discrimination. Young, 427 U.S. at 71-73.
The Justices roles stayed the same, with the same authors of plurality and con-
curring opinions except that Justice Blackmun and Justice White switched places:
Justice Blackmun voting with the majority in Paifica, while Justice White voted
with the majority in Young.
1996]
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Second, the premise concerning low value speech receives - at
best - disputed support in Pacifica. Justices Powell and Blackmun,
two of the five Justices supporting the FCC's order, explicitly re-
jected the view that the Constitution permits the government to dis-
tinguish between speech which "is most 'valuable' and hence
deserving the most protection, and speech which is less 'valuable'
and hence deserving of less protection."32 Rather, the concurring
Justices stated, "[tihis is a judgment for each person to make
.... , Thus, Justices Powell and Blackmun argued that "the result
... does not turn on whether Carlin's monologue ... [has] more or
less 'value' than a candidate's campaign speech."34
The view of these two Justices, when combined with the dis-
sent, was the majority view in Pacifica. It also represents standard
First Amendment theory. Of course, not all content-based regula-
tion will or should be invalidated.35 Still, any universal condemna-
tion of content discrimination is implausible. Usually, the critique
takes the form of showing that not all such regulation should be
32. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 761 (Powell, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See STEVE SHIFFRIN, FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY AND ROMANCE 26-44
(1990).
Speaking for the Court, Justice Scalia came close to recommending that all
content discrimination, with a few special exceptions, be considered impermissible
in RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). He argued content discrimina-
tion was impermissible even in the context of speech, specifically, fighting words,
not protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 385-87. Suppression of presumably
protected commercial speech on the basis of content, however, is routinely al-
lowed even without that strong of a government interest. See, e.g., United States v.
Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993); Posadas de P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co.
of P.R. 478 U.S. 328 (1986). In other words, he protects unprotected speech
more than the Court protects commercial speech. Justice Scalia's odd position can
be seen in a better light, however, by remembering even nonverbal activities might
be protected if engaged in for expressiye reasons and if the government's regula-
tion was "[related) to the suppression of free expression." United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) - which is presumably an objection to a govern-
ment interest involving suppression of content. Under the O'Brien approach, how-
ever, the question should be whether the government's interest in prohibiting
racially-based fighting words (presumptively an activity not protected by the First
Amendment) was related to its interest in suppressing their expressive aspect or
their "fighting" aspect. If the government regulation was not designed to show
"special hostility towards the particular biases," RA.V., 505 U.S. at 396, but rather
out of fear that these fighting words create an unusually great danger of violence,
his argument collapses. In addition, his argument requires an explanation of why
the government's interest in suppressing particular commercial speech does not
invalidate those regulations. A possible answer, but not one the Court has yet
given, is that, unlike either the draft card burner in O'Brien or the fighting words
speaker in R.A.V, commercial speakers do not have First Amendment rights of
their own.
[Vol. III: p. 45
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equated with suppression of disfavored content; that is, with "abridg-
ment" of the constitutional freedom.3 6 Routinely, the government
chooses to subsidize speech based on its content - for example,
classroom materials or National Endowment for the Arts grants.
Arguably, the mandate that broadcasters include public affairs
programming or children's programming should likewise be
treated more as a constitutionally permissible subsidy than an
abridgment.3 7
In contrast, a balancing analysis using the notion of "lesser val-
ued speech" to determine whether to permit government suppres-
sion can result in upholding the government-dictated conformity
that the First Amendment should be seen to guard against. The
prominence of Justice Harlan's opinion in Cohen v. California8 lies
not only in his view that the First Amendment "put[s] the decision
as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us
... in the belief that no other approach would comport with the
premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political
system rests."39 It also lies in his recognition of the often vitally im-
portant "emotive function" of speech and his refusal to "indulge
the facial assumption that one can forbid particular words without
also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the pro-
cess." 4° Regulation of "lesser valued" speech generally offends each
of these concerns. Protection of speech that majorities view as less-
valued is the key function of the First Amendment. Only this pro-
tection provides for an inclusive politics and a process of societal
and personal change that is not limited to electoral politics. Thus,
putting aside the universability of any purported principle ob-
jecting to content discrimination, government suppression of less-
valued speech should be constitutionally objectionable. It follows
that a defense of Pacifica on grounds other than the premise that
indecency is less-valued and, therefore, permissibly suppressed
would be much more consistent with First Amendment theory.
36. See Baker, Turner Broadcasting, supra note 19; Shiffrin, supra note 35. See
also Geoffrey R. Stone and William P. Marshall, Brown v. Socialist Workers: Inequality
as a Command of the First Amendment, 1983 Sup. C-. REv. 583 (1983).
37. See Standards for Children's Television Programming: Children's Televi-
sion Act of 1990, 47 U.S.C.A. § 303(a) (1991).
38. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). The Supreme Court overturned Cohen's conviction
for disturbing the peace by walking through a courthouse corridor wearing a
jacket with the words "Fuck the Draft" appearing on it. Id. at 16.
39. Id. at 24. SeeWhitneyv. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis,
J., concurring).
40. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26. According to Justice Harlan, the emotive function
of individual speech is often the more important element of the all-inclusive
message the communicator sought to express. Id.
1996]
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Finally, the balancing premise for weak protection should be
troubling. At least one reason why many of the strongest free
speech advocates have opposed balancing - even though they often
argue about what expression the First Amendment protects - is
their assumption that balancing, especially in a process that permits
judges and majorities to consider different speech as having differ-
ent value, 41 will be particularly ill-suited to protecting the dissenters
whom the First Amendment should be seen as primarily designed
to protect.42 Of course, a speaker is wise to balance considerations
in favor of or against his or her expressive choices. Balancing can
hardly be disparaged if equated with judgment, but the constitu-
tional question is the allocation of authority to make judgments.
The fear is that the government's or the majority's evaluation of
particular speech will differ from that of the speaker or listener,
particularly when this is the potential speaker or listener who, a dis-
sident from the majority's perspective, appears offensively crazy or
irrational. Inevitably, balancing depends on who does it - such that
government officials and judges will seldom place the same value
on the speech of dissidents as the dissidents would place on their
own speech.
This is the point thatJustice Harlan gets to when he argues for
leaving the decision in "the hand of each of us." 43 Thus, it would
be nice if Pacifica could be explained as something other than a
balancing decision. And that might be possible. The argument
need not be that the weak interest in indecent speech is out-
weighed by a government interest in suppression, if channeling in
this context should not be seen as suppression or abridgment at all.
II. STRONG PROTECTION
The question becomes whether any reading of Pacifica is con-
sistent with strong protection of speech and what elements of the
opinion support this interpretation. Surely, a strongly speech-pro-
tective principle would not allow suppression merely because the
government concludes that the speech is either unimportant or ob-
jectionable. This conclusion should apply in any communications
41. Although I have objected to balancing in the time, place and manner
context, the fact that these regulations do not involve a comparative assessment of
the value of different speech may explain why some First Amendment absolutists
(e.g., Justice Black, Justice Douglas and Professor Thomas Emerson) have not
made this objection. See C. EDWIN BAKER, HuMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH
125-93 (1989) [hereinafter BAKER, HuMAN LIBERTY].
42. Shiffrin, supra note 35.
43. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24.
[Vol. III: p. 45
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medium. Strong protection would not balance an abridgment
against other government interests; rather, the only constitutional
question should be whether the government action amounts to an
abridgment.
Whether channeling amounts to an abridgment may depend
on the context and on the nature of the channeling. For example,
effective advocacy often requires that the advocates speak or
demonstrate at places or times that their desired audience is avail-
able. The government would undermine the advocates' expressive
activity or, in doctrinal language, it would fail to leave ample alter-
natives if it channeled their expression to a location where the dem-
onstrators could not confront their audience. Moreover, a
demonstrator's public speech often depends on its location or time
for its meaning. In these circumstances, channeling that interfered
with the advocates' goals should be impermissible. The determina-
tive value should be the advocates' expressive freedom.
These concerns were not present in either Pacifica or American
Mini Theaters. In the latter, Justice Powell noted precisely this point.
In down-playing the First Amendment significance of the zoning
ordinance, he stated that the regulated "communication ... is not
of a kind in which the content or effectiveness of the message de-
pends in some measure upon where or how it is conveyed."
44
The most obvious parallel between Pacifica and American Mini
Theaters is that they are both media cases. 45 The primary constitu-
tional function of the media is to provide the public with the infor-
mation, opinion, and vision they want or need.46 Presumably, the
44. Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 78 n.2 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (citing three cases, Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 91
(1972); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536
(1965), involving demonstrations where place was relevant to effectiveness and
content). See Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139
U. PA. L. REv. 615 (1991); BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY, supra note 41, at 161-93.
45. Justice Powell described Young as involving "commercial zoning" of com-
mercial entities. This, he argued, was "not analogous to cases involving expression
in public forums or to those involving individual expression." Young, 427 U.S. at
76. At least in this commercial media context - i.e., he again cites only media cases
for the proposition-"the central First Amendment concern remains the need to
maintain free access of the public to the expression." Id. at 77. In contrast, Justice
Powell cites speech cases involving individuals as illustrating a factor not involved
here - i.e., situations where "the content or effectiveness of the message depends in
some measure upon where or how it is conveyed." Id. at 78 n.2.
46. My claim might be considered controversial in its breadth. For example,
possibly the key constitutional function of the media is to perform a "checking
function." See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM.
B. FOUND. RES.J. 521 (1977) (discussing free exchange as valuable due to checking
function). However, these more restricted views of the media's function justify no
greater, and possibly less, protection in this context.
1996]
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question concerning abridgment should be whether the channel-
ing in any significant respect interferes with the public's access to
the media content. Sometimes the answer will be yes. Surely the
content, meaning or value of "news" relates to when it is made avail-
able. Thus, arguably any time - channeling of news would signifi-
cantly interfere with access if it prevents media organizations from
presenting news as quickly as they choose. In this regard, the Court
noted the FCC's indication that it would not automatically hold a
licensee responsible for indecency in public events covered live. 47
On the other hand, limited channeling does not necessarily have
objectionable consequences for either the content or availability of
commercial entertainment. Unlike with many demonstrators or
political advocates, the media typically seeks to present entertain-
ment only to an audience that wants the content offered. For ex-
ample, theaters seek only audiences willing to make an effort to
receive the expression - i.e., an audience willing to come to the the-
ater and pay.
The government clearly abridges freedom of the press if it
"suppresses" what the press can communicate. But the issue is
whether there is suppression here. For example, is the public in
any serious way restricted if the government requires that Carlin's
monologue not be broadcast until after six o'clock or in the eve-
ning? This question is properly posed since the Court's holding, as
it repeatedly emphasized, was only that the government could re-
strict the monologue at two o'clock in the afternoon.48
So what would be an appropriate analysis from the perspective
of strong speech protection? First, setting aside the question of the
First Amendment rights of children, surely any government restric-
tion aimed at minor children would be inconsistent with the First
Amendment if it significantly restricted adult's access to protected
expression. Strong protection requires at least the principle articu-
lated in Butler v. Michigan,49 that the state cannot enact laws that
"reduce the adult population . . . to reading only what is fit for
children."50 Applying this principle to broadcast channeling, the
apparent rule would be that a channeling which serves the state's
interest may be upheld if it does not materially reduce the availabil-
ity of the material to adults. Keeping FCC-defined indecency out of
the bulk of prime time television would restrict its availability to
47. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 733 n.7 (1987).
48. Id. at 760.
49. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
50. Id. at 383.
[Vol. III: p. 45
10
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol3/iss1/3
THE EVENING HouRs
many working adults. At least it would if many working adults often
go to bed not much later than ten o'clock p.m. and certainly would
not routinely plan to watch a two hour program starting at ten
o'clock p.m.5 1 Thus, I suggest, any channeling consistent with
strong-speech protection and with the Butler principle must cease at
least by the early evening hours of six o'clock or maybe eight
o'clock p.m.
A. Pacifica and Permissible Channeling
There are two reasons to conclude that the FCC can impose
only restricted channeling, such as programs during the afternoon
but not banning during the evening hours: first, if restricted chan-
neling is most consistent with the purpose that the Court concludes
justifies channeling; or second, if the Court accepts a strong speech
principle. The Court's limited holding in Pacifica is not conclusive
on either point, but perhaps the best reading supports both
reasons.
In Pacifica, the Court appeared to jumble two quite different
government purposes, although sometimes the second seemed to
be merely a careless description of the first. Justice Powell de-
scribed the FCC's "primary concern" as "prevent[ing] . . the
broadcast from reaching the ears of unsupervised children."52 He
quoted a lengthy passage (also cited by Justice Stevens) from Gins-
berg v. New York,53 where the Court upheld a prohibition on selling
certain sexually explicit but constitutionally protected publications
to minors.54 In this passage, the Ginsberg Court explained that the
law was "designed to aid" parental (and others such as teachers')
authority in deciding what materials to make available to their chil-
dren.55 Justice Powell, extrapolating from Ginsberg, stated that soci-
ety may decide to "leav[e] to parents the decision as to what speech
of this kind their children shall hear and repeat."56 Or, as the ma-
jority put it, "the concerns recognized in Ginsberg amply justify spe-
51. Admittedly, this may have been more true in the small town in Kentucky
where I grew up than in New York City where I now live.
52. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 757 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring injudgment) (emphasis added).
53. 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
54. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 758 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment). Compare id. at 749-50.
55. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639.
56. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 758 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
1996]
11
Baker: The Evening Hours during Pacifica Standard Time
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
56 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
cial treatment of indecent broadcasting,"57 including "supporting
parents' claim[s] to authority in their own household."5
At times, however, the Court in Pacifica invokes an arguably
quite different government purpose. The majority described Gins-
berg as justified by the "government's interest in the 'well-being of
its youth.' "59 Additionally, Justice Powell, in his concurrence, as-
serted that "society may attempt to shield its children" from inde-
cent material. 60 Such assertions suggest that society has an interest
in keeping indecency from children independent of its interest in
supporting parental authority. However, if the Court is truly ac-
cepting this second purpose rather than merely sloppily referring
to the first,61 its acceptance would be a startling constitutional de-
velopment, which gives some reason to doubt that the Court's
causal undeveloped and undefended statement really amounted to
such a commitment. Moreover, such a purpose would have signifi-
cantly different consequences for government's regulation of
broadcast indecency than does support for parental authority or
any of the narrowing aspects of its holding. For example, a societal
purpose of shielding children from indecent material would be
served by - in fact, might require - a law prohibiting a parent from
allowing her child to hear Carlin's dialogue. Such a law, of course,
would directly contradict the first purpose - supporting parental au-
thority in the household.
Not only is there little reason to think the Court in Pacifica
seriously intended to accept the implications of this second pur-
pose, the language from Ginsberg upon which it relied is easily read
to suggest that the second purpose would itself be unconstitutional.
There the Court stated that "constitutional interpretation has consist-
ently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their own
57. Id. at 750 (quoting Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 629).
58. Id. at 749 (quotations omitted).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 758 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
61. The tendency to conflate these two purposes is ubiquitous. In Action for
Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1988), the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit noted that the FCC had asserted both
a "compelling interest in protecting children from indecent material" and an in-
terest in "parents, who are entitled to decide whether their children are exposed to
such material if it is aired." Id. At oral argument, the FCC "clarified the govern-
ment's interest: it is the interest in protecting unsupervised children from expo-
sure to indecent material; the government does not propose to act in loco parentis
.... Id.
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household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the
structure of our society."62
The two purposes lead to different observations about appro-
priate channeling. Only a complete ban on broadcast indecency
could fully serve a governmental purpose of eliminating broadcast-
ing as a route for children to obtain access to indecency since some
children will inevitably be in the audience at any hour. I am surely
not unique in having parents who allowed me to have a transistor
radio in my room which I could turn on at low volume at any time
of night - and I am told that today's children sometimes even have a
television in their room. Although a child might follow parental di-
rectives as to appropriate use of the radio or television, nothing but
a complete ban on indecency could effectuate a state purpose to
shield such a child. But obviously, a complete ban contradicts
Pacifica's assumption that only channeling was approved.
In contrast, support for parental supervision has very different
implications for the extent of permissible and justifiable channel-
ing. Although a complete ban could serve those who do not want
their children exposed to any broadcast indecency, it would thwart,
not aid, the possibly significant numbers of parents who would
choose either to expose their children to the Carlin broadcast or to
give the choice to the child.63 There is no channeling "fix" that
completely or uniformly serves all parents. Still, a focus on hours
when most parents are not at home could make sense. Assuming,
which is not at all clear, that a significant number of parents are
quite concerned with FCC-defined indecency, but are not otherwise
concerned with what their children watch,64 restricting indecency
62. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 758 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) (quoting Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639) (emphasis added).
63. See Action for Children's Television, 852 F.2d at 1334 n.21 (discussing argu-
ment that parental authority enhanced by regulation).
64. Of course, these parents might merely bar their children from watching
television or listening to radio during hours they are not at home or bar them
from doing so except for specifically approved programs or stations - resulting in
no need for channeling. But even accepting this naive conception of people's real
options, channeling would still be beneficial to the extent that many parents who
do not want their children exposed to broadcast indecency would prefer to be able
to allow their children unrestricted access to broadcasting during the day. Expect-
ing most parents to exercise extensive supervision when they are present may also
be naive but no more than the expectation that, even if there were no indecency
on broadcasting, parents who wish to shield their children from indecent language
will have much success.
On the other hand, many parents may seriously doubt whether FCC-defined
indecency has any specially negative impact on children as compared to violent
programming or to "proper," that is, not legally indecent, but sexually suggestive,
often overtly sexist, programming and advertising. Social science data suggests
that the FCC's indecency rules may aim at the wrong target - violent programming
1996]
13
Baker: The Evening Hours during Pacifica Standard Time
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
58 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAw JOURNAL
during all or a portion of adults' regular working hours could be
almost parent optimal as compared to an unregulated realm.65
Many parents would appreciate being able to depend on a period
of the broadcast day during which they could confidently allow un-
supervised listening or viewing by children without fear that the
children would be exposed to this type of indecency. On the other
hand, those parents with broader notions of what broadcasting is
appropriate for their children to watch, or those adults with
broader tastes for their own viewing, would not have their interests
in the receipt of expression significantly impaired. They could
watch - or allow their children to watch - the restricted programs
during the evening.
From the perspective of a strong theory of the First Amend-
ment, totally impairing the option to receive unrestricted expres-
sion would be an "abridgment." Barring indecency only during the
afternoon broadcasts, however, would not significantly intrude on
individuals' access to expression. And it might significantly support
parental control. For these reasons, it might be permissible while
more extensive channeling should not be.
B. Back to the Decisions
Despite contrary dicta noted above,66 the best reading of
Pacifica supports, and is certainly consistent with, the strong speech-
protective interpretation of the First Amendment. As noted,
Pacifica and American Mini Theaters should be read in combination.
American Mini Theaters implicitly accepted the strong speech-pro-
tected principle embodied in Butler - that the zoning of constitu-
tionally protected material must not restrict the availability of
protected speech, at least to the adult audience that has the consti-
tutional right in relation to the material. 67 There, the Court noted
that the "ordinances are not challenged on the ground that they
being the category that creates serious harms. Since the FCC has shown little sup-
port for the notion that substantial numbers of parents share the concerns that the
FCC attributes to them as opposed to concerns about the total amount of televi-
sion their children view or the violence they see, the FCC's channeling may not actu-
ally further any legitimate purpose.
65. Those who neither want to view nor have their children view indecency
will be disadvantaged as compared to a regime with a complete ban - but I assume
the First Amendment makes the unregulated environment the appropriate base-
line from which deviation is permitted, but only deviations in ways that do not
suppress speech.
66. See, e.g., supra notes 55 & 56 and accompanying text.
67. Compare the "ample alternatives" requirement for time, place and man-
ner regulation. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989);
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
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impose a limit on the total number of adult theaters" 68 and then
observed that, even given this zoning regulation, "the market for
this commodity is essentially unrestrained." 69 The plurality ex-
plained that "It]he situation would be quite different if the ordi-
nance had the effect of suppressing, or greatly restricting access to,
lawful speech." 70 Justice Powell's concurrence further emphasized
that "there is no indication that ... [the Ordinance] has the effect
of suppressing production of or, to any significant degree, restrict-
ing access to adult movies." 71 Both Justices Stevens and Powell re-
lied on the district court's findings that the zoning had not
restricted availability. 72
Pacifica had no obvious occasion to explicitly adopt the Butler
principle, which presumably would permit only limited channeling
by the FCC, since it continually emphasized how limited, how fact
specific, was its holding that the FCC could ban monologue. Still,
in its final substantive paragraph, where it again "emphasiz[ed] the
narrowness of [its] holding," and again referred to the "nuisance
rationale" and noted the importance of the "time of day" of the
broadcast, the Court asserted in a footnote that the FCC's action
did not violate the Butler principle. 73 The concurrence was even
more explicit. Noting the Butler principle, Justice Powell cautioned
that "[t]he Commission certainly should consider it as it develops
standards in this area."74 Justice Powell properly observed that the
principle was "not sufficiently strong to leave the [FCC] powerless
to act in circumstances such as those in this case,"75 which he de-
scribed as barring "Carlin's monologue over the radio in the early
afternoon hours."76 After noting various examples of language
practices not covered, the concurrence accepted the FCC's order
"on the facts of this case." 77 When Justice Powell concluded with
the observation that he "doubt[s] whether today's decision will pre-
vent any adult who wishes to receive Carlin's message in Carlin's
own words from doing so,"78 he essentially accepted the mandate of
Butler. At such a point, any constitutional challenge will reduce to
68. Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 59 (1976).
69. Id. at 62.
70. Id. at 71 n.35.
71. Id. at 77 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
72. Id. at 71 n.35 & 79 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
73. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 n.28 (1978).
74. Id. at 760 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 761.
78. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 762.
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an empirical dispute over whether the chosen form of channeling
will or will not suppress protected speech.
CONCLUSION
I have claimed that the governmental purpose that most clearly
supports the channeling approved in Pacifica only calls for a re-
stricted channeling - a ban that would not extend to the evening
when a parent is more likely to be at home and potentially able to
supervise children in the house. Moreover, Pacifica's analysis stays
consistent with the constitutional principles implicit in a strong-
speech protective interpretation of the First Amendment. This in-
terpretation would permit limited channeling because this does not
significantly impair and thus does not abridge the media's right to
make its programming available to an audience. But it would rule
out channeling that significantly reduces the availability of broad-
cast indecency to adults (or to children whose parents would allow
them to listen or watch).
POSTSCRIPT
Since this talk was given, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit decided Action for Children's Televi-
sion v. FCC.79 The en banc decision invalidated the ban on com-
mercial stations' broadcasts of indecency for the two hours between
ten o'clock p.m. and midnight only because some public stations
were allowed to broadcast indecent materials during that period.80
In its primary discussion, however, the court of appeals upheld in
principle a ban on indecency except for a "safe harbor" between
midnight and six o'clock a.m.81 This decision represents a rejec-
tion of the strong speech position and is not required by Pacifica.
Although my talk aimed at a theoretical understanding of the pro-
priety of channeling rather than a current statement of the law,
some comment about this decision seems merited.
Two aspects of the majority's approach diverge from the re-
quirements for strong speech protection: first, its reliance on the
government's asserted interest in the well-being of children as ajus-
tification for barring broadcasts of indecency from six o'clock a.m.
to midnight;82 and second, its doctrinal commitment to upholding
79. 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc) [hereinafter ACT Vj.
80. Id. at 669.
81. Id. at 664-69.
82. Id. at 660-63. The majority of the court of appeals, sitting en banc, found
the government's interest in "support for parental supervision of children [ ]" and
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a suppression of protected speech if the regulation promotes a
compelling governmental interest by the least restrictive means.83
A. Governmental Purpose
Strong protection is consistent with channeling to achieve a
purpose that does not require abridgment of First Amendment
rights. Such a purpose was identified in Pacifica. Channeling dur-
ing a portion of the day aids parents by providing a period of time
during which those parents who want to keep their children unex-
posed do not have to monitor their children's viewing while also
leaving ample time for broadcasting any protected speech chosen
by the broadcaster, thus not disabling broadcasters from providing
parents a broader range of choice for themselves and, if they want,
for their children.
Strong protection is inconsistent with pursuing any purpose
that requires reducing adults to the level of children. The court of
appeals, however, upheld a six o'clock a.m. to midnight ban on the
basis of a state purpose to shield children from broadcast inde-
cency. Possibly, Pacifica credited this purpose because it saw no dif-
ference, or at least no conflict, between this interest and parental
control in the context of Pacifica's two o'clock p.m. broadcast. The
court of appeals, however, concluded that this purpose supports an
extensive ban. It cited data indicating that approximately twenty-
one percent of teenagers watched television between eleven o'clock
and eleven-thirty p.m., over fifteen percent between eleven-thirty
p.m. and one o'clock a.m., but only about five percent between one
forty-five a.m. and two o'clock a.m.84 The fall-off of viewing during
late hours, however, did not differ that much from the viewing by
adults. For example, only about fifteen percent of Chicago's adult
viewers were in the audience at midnight.8 5 Thus, the channeling
that shields most kids equally shields most adults, effectively reduc-
ing them to the level of kids.
This second purpose also conflicts with parental authority for
those parents who think that their children (or the older ones)
should be able to view (at least some) indecent broadcast program-
ming or who want to teach their children self-discipline in respect
"a concern for children's well-being.. ." compelling enough to uphold the restric-
tion. Id. at 660-61.
83. Id. at 663-64.
84. ACT IV, 58 F.3d at 665.
85. Id. at 666.
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to their viewing habits.8 6 In no case has the Supreme Court ever
found a state purpose concerning children compelling or even ac-
ceptable when it involves the state prevailing over parental author-
ity within the home8 7 unless the injury to the child is relatively
indisputable.88
Other problems with the Court's reasoning do not go to the
theoretical points discussed here. For example, the Court should
have found it difficult to accept either the claim that the purpose of
shielding children from these indecent broadcasts is compelling or
is effectively advanced by the channeling. Unlike the considerable
evidence that shows the harmful effects of violent programming on
children, the government was unable to cite any social science evi-
dence showing harmful effects of indecent programming.89 Like-
wise, the government did not seriously pursue that purpose. The
reason channeling is okay, the government argued, is that it would
be entirely ineffective in respect to any child whose parents are will-
ing to allow the viewing of such programming.90
86. Chief Judge Edwards aptly stated that:
my right as a parent has been preempted, not facilitated, if I am told that
certain programming will be banned from my... television. Congress
cannot take away my right to decide what my children watch, absent some
showing that my children are in fact at risk of harm from exposure to
indecent programming.
Id. at 670 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Alliance for Community Media v.
FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 145 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Edwards, C.J., dissenting)) (quotations
omitted).
87. "[Constitutional] interpretation has consistently recognized that the par-
ent's claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their chil-
dren is basic in the structure of our society." ACT IV, 58 F.3d at 678 (Edwards, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968)).
88. ACT IV, at 663. The court cited Ginsberg for its claim that the Supreme
Court treated the two purposes as complementary rather than as in conflict. Char-
acterizing the purposes as complementary makes sense in Ginsberg, where the regu-
lation only applied outside the home, but not here, where the government limits
the programming that comes into the home during hours when children (and
adults) are usually awake, thereby taking choice away from parents. Oddly, the
court quoted Justice Brennan's observation that the ban did not bar parents from
purchasing the material for their children - in other words, it did not prevent par-
ents from doing what it barred children doing on their own. Id. This observation
implicitly recognizes parental control, not shielding children, as paramount. Id.
Only by discrediting parents' interest in using free broadcast television to provide
their children access to some indecent materials was the court able to find parental
control not compromised by a six o'clock a.m. to midnight ban. Id.
89. ACT IV, 58 F.3d at 681-82 (Edwards, J., dissenting). But see id. at 661
(arguing that Supreme Court has never held that "scientific demonstration of psy-
chological harm is required in order to establish the constitutionality of measures
protecting minors from exposure to indecent speech").
90. Id. at 682.
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B. Abridging Speech to Promote a Governmental Interest
Strong protection of speech requires that the government pur-
sue the public interest by means that do not abridge speech free-
dom. Most Supreme Court cases upholding speech claims follow
roughly that approach. They determine whether protected speech
is regulated and, if so, whether the regulation should be considered
an abridgment. Some regulation, for example, time, place and
manner regulations are considered less problematic. Other regula-
tion, for example, according to some theories, content regulation,
is presumptively invalid unless it fits some narrow and theoretically
justified category of non-protected speech.
Nevertheless, the relatively recent Supreme Court practice, fol-
lowed by the court of appeals, applies the test of whether the gov-
ernment regulation advances a compelling governmental interest
by the least restrictive means. This equal protection test has, Justice
Kennedy observed, "found its way into our First Amendment juris-
prudence of late, even where the sole question is, or ought to be,
whether the restriction is in fact content-based."91 But applying this
equal protection test to First Amendment questions is surely
misguided.
Even in the equal protection area, the compelling-governmen-
tal-interest least-restrictive-means test is uninformative - laws are
only really struck down when they manifest an impermissible pur-
pose. And the test should be and usually is ignored if it suggests the
wrong result, and it is regularly manipulated - the Court regularly
and disingenuously describes a law's purpose as being one that the
law does not advance when the Court recognizes that the law
should be struck down because its real purpose is impermissible. 92
Still, in the equal protection context, at least the notion of respect-
ing people's equality might be maintained if a law that disadvan-
tages a "discrete and insular minority" is justified by a compelling
interest that could even convince members of the disadvantaged
group, the worst off, that they are better off with the disadvanta-
geous law because the purpose is important even for them - like
temporary racial segregation during a prison race riot. In the First
Amendment context, however, the norm of respecting people's lib-
erty can not be advanced by a law that restricts that liberty.
91. Simon & Schuster v. New York State Crime Victims' Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 125
(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
92. Baker, Turner Broadcasting, supra note 19, at 122-26; C. Edwin Baker, Neu-
trality, Process, and Rationality: Flawed Interpretations of Equal Protection, 58 TEXAS L.
REv. 1029 (1980).
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Most unconstitutional limitations on free speech have been
designed, usually quite narrowly, to advance interests that many
people consider very important -certainly as important as the "com-
pelling" purpose of ineffectively shielding children from material
not shown to be harmful to them. If applied honestly, this equal
protection tailoring standard would require the Court to uphold
most regulations of speech that it has struck down. Of course, by
characterizing the government interest as insufficiently important
or by manipulating its description so that it appears not well served,
courts can, when they want, use this standard to strike down virtu-
ally any suppression. The test, however, neither encourages serious
protection nor properly focuses the constitutional inquiry.
The civil libertarian premise is that the government must not
advance public interests by means that suppress protected speech.
And the civil libertarian doubts that the government either wisely
or effectively advances legitimate interests by suppressing individual
liberty. Justice Kennedy had it right when he argued that when
[t]he regulated content has the full protection of the First
Amendment... [this] is itself a full and sufficient reason
for holding the statute unconstitutional .... [I] t is both
unnecessary and incorrect to ask whether the State can
show that the statute "is necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."93
Justice Kennedy's assertion, of course, either requires invalida-
tion of channeling, as the dissents in Young and Pacifica argued, or,
as I argued here, upholding channeling but only if the version up-
held cannot be persuasively characterized as abridging speech. Ar-
guably, channeling does not abridge if it does not substantially
impair adult audiences' access to movies or broadcast indecency.
But by this standard, ACT IV was wrongly decided.
93. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 124 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Ar-
kansas Writer's Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987)).
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